Planning Policy Strategy and Energy, Part III

by Byron King

for Whiskey & Gunpowder
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In Parts I and II of this article, I discussed the concepts of planning, policy, and strategy and connected them with the phenomenon of Peak Oil. My goal was and is to promote thinking about what can be called a true "energy strategy." (As opposed to the "What, me worry?" strategy that presently dominates public policy.)

In outlining my arguments, I borrowed extensively from the political, policy, and strategic ideas of Karl von Clausewitz, set out in his historical study of policy and strategy, On War, published in 1832.

Clausewitz was certainly not writing about oil, in that his book was published 27 years before Col. Edwin Drake inaugurated the Age of Oil at Titusville, Pa. Instead, Clausewitz was reviewing the Napoleonic Wars through the lens of policy and strategy.

But I believe that the ideas Clausewitz developed have much broader scope than just in the martial arena, and particular applicability to the Peak Oil world and what will follow.

More Policy, Strategy, and Energy

At the end of Part II, I was discussing the national-level U.S. warfighting policy and strategy during World War II. I described the policy and strategic context of some of the major decisions of World War II, such as the timing of the D-day invasion of France and the Navy and Marine Corps invasion and capture of Iwo Jima.

These major battle events did not happen in isolation, but were part of a strategic plan. Strategic events never happen in isolation, and that is a point well worth remembering.

In Part II of this article, I referred to the famous statement of Japan's Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, who in 1940 told the Japanese Premier Fumimaro Konoe, "If I am told to fight the Americans, I shall run wild for the first six months. I can promise to give them hell. But I have utterly no confidence for the second or third year."

Yamamoto truly understood the policy and strategy implications of resource-poor Japan waging a major war against the United States, with its vast resources.

This was no idle comment by Yamamoto. The commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy was consistent in his beliefs, and in 1941 stated, "Anyone who has seen the auto factories of Detroit and the oil fields of Texas knows that Japan lacks the national power for a naval race with America."

(Note: I wonder if there are any modern equivalents of Adm. Yamamoto in other countries making the same observations today and coming to a different conclusion?)

But there was a curious logic of politics and policymaking at work within the highest levels of Japan's government in the late 1930s and early 1940s. It was Japan's lack of resources, its self-perception of a "lack of national power" that prompted its leadership to mobilize the military and strike out in wars of expansion and conquest.

But for now, enough discussion of warfighting in World War II and the industrial planning that supported it in the United States. And we will discuss Japan further in this article, but with reference to postwar progress, not dwelling on the failed the Japanese war effort. (But I will return to these themes in future articles.)

For now, I am deliberately going to overstate what I believe to be the case with respect to U.S. energy policy and strategy. I am going to overstate the case just to be sure I am not understating it.

More on the "Free Market" as a Strategy

What is the basic fallback principle to which Americans tend to revert when confronted with hard questions of industrial policy? It is that "free markets" are generally better at organizing economic activity for wealth and profit and promoting general progress than are government plans? The idea of "government planning" is anathema to most Americans.

It brings to mind visions of the five-year plans of the Soviet Union, or the political discomfort of allowing the government to pick winners and losers, as in modern Japan. This strikes most Americans as just plain wrong. It is far better, goes the thinking, to allow people the freedom to take risks, and one hopes to come up with better ideas, if not better mousetraps.

The idea of a free market in goods and services is, in fact, such an icon of American economic belief that federal, state, and even local governments will go to the most extreme lengths to establish and enforce policies that ensure that so-called "freedom" reigns in the marketplace.

Localities across the land will, for example, license and regulate the humble hot dog peddler, so as to preserve the "free market" in taxpaying restaurants. Oh, wait a minute. That is not such a free market after all, is it?

Still, if the market for goods and services is not free, for example due to the rise of "trust-like" behavior on the part of businesses, then, by golly, the government will regulate it some more. That way, if the market is not "free," it will at least be "fair."

So as things currently stand in the United States, the government regulates the air we breathe, the water we drink, the food we eat, the medicines we ingest, the content of the paint on the walls, the thickness of the sidewalk beneath our feet, and...you get the picture. All caricature aside, the American free market is hardly "free."

Despite this apparent dichotomy of freedom through regulation, some people still ask questions along the lines of, "Why isn't it enough to leave energy prices to market forces?" And that is a fair question. Let's take it at face value.

There is a lot of evidence that the so-called free market in energy, particularly for oil and oil products, has worked well for many decades, bringing cheap energy to many people. So why is it necessary for the government, or anyone else, to "plan" for the energy future? Does the free market not work anymore?

And if the free market in energy supplies does not work, then what is the answer? After all, there is a great deal of evidence that the long lines for gasoline in the United States in 1974 were caused by government regulation of the product distribution channels, not because of the Arab oil embargo.

And even the recent spot shortages of fuel in some places in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina were not really failures of the free market so much as they were related to the natural-social phenomenon of mass evacuations from coastal areas that occurred at the urging of government officials.

As things worked out recently, spiking gasoline prices served as one of the clearest of market signals that there was money to be made. So high prices for gas drew supplies of fuel product back into the otherwise barren marketplace. This is Economics 101-type stuff.

Industrial Policy on a National Scale

But look at the issue from the other direction. "Turn the map around," as the Marines like to say. Look at your situation, and think about your plan, through the eyes and mind of your opponent. And consider the possibility that, from time to time, things change to the point that the old ways really no longer work, nor do the old constructs apply.

The great scholar of management Peter Drucker noted that some industries and some kinds of economic activity are clearly national in scale, and are thus the inherent province of national policy. The oil industry in general is clearly one of these types of economic activities.

For well over a century, the oil industry has been heavily scripted, regulated, and taxed, from the most remote field drilling prospect to the point where the gasoline pump nozzle enters the gas tank of the automobile at the humble point of purchase.

Moving back up the chain from the gasoline pump, the fact is that America purchases immense amounts of oil from abroad. And at the far distant end of that long chain of commerce, the United States has a global-scale military commitment to, as the saying goes, "ensure access" to these foreign oil supplies.

I am not trying to tell you something you do not already know, but instead point out the reality that the so-called free market in oil is not really free, or anything close to free. No big government, no cheap oil.

Ask yourself this question: "How much does a barrel of oil really cost?" Look beyond just the posted price on the New York Mercantile Exchange. To come up with an approximation of the true price for oil, you have to add in all of the external costs, such as the U.S. foreign military commitment that "ensures access" to the stuff. Then divide by the number of barrels produced.

Depending upon whose numbers you want to believe, the additional cost of the "security" component of a barrel of oil landed in the United States ranges from $20 per barrel to over $60 per barrel. So the true cost of oil to the U.S. economy may be close to twice the posted price.

(And the rest of the oil-using world, which does not directly pay the costs of the U.S. military commitment to "ensure access" otherwise picked up by the taxpayers of America, thanks us every day, as I am sure you, dear readers, have noticed. But I digress.)

Furthermore, an energy industry facing Peak Oil is even more so one of these types of industries of which Drucker wrote. In Part I of this article, I discussed the rather pessimistic views of James Kunstler about the U.S. energy future. And I discussed the somewhat more optimistic views of Peter Tertzakian.

No matter to which of these alternative futures you might subscribe, they both forecast that supplies of conventional crude oil will begin to tighten and then begin an irreversible decline down the Hubbert curve. In the end, things in the oil industry will become even more heavily scripted, regulated, and taxed.

The U.S. military commitment to "ensure access" to oil supplies will become even larger and more dispersed and more costly. And that is if everything holds together and follows current trends, and does not just blow up and spin out of control.

The core of the problem in all of this is that there is little or no strategic rationality to what is going on, certainly not in the United States. To the extent that there is any high-level planning in the U.S. energy arena, it is inadequate if it does not just plain stink. From an economic standpoint, Americans are using oil products not priced according to their true costs. Cheap gas and cheap money are simply incompatible over the long run. And maybe even over the short run, considering where we are now.

Tax Policy Is Energy Policy

Study after study in many different nations and economies has shown, for example, that the best way to avoid having to scramble for new supply sources of oil is to control the growth of demand, if not outright to reduce absolute demand.

In other words, it is not about "imports from the Middle East," as referenced in the president's State of the Union speech. It is all about aggregate demand for a depleting product. So is it possible to reduce aggregate demand? The short answer is yes -- and I do not mean by using a totalitarian or authoritarian approach.

Consider Japan, a postwar industrial powerhouse, and now a respected parliamentary democracy that today uses less oil than it did in 1974. That is, after 32 years of economic growth (OK, including a severe recession in the late 1980s and 1990s), Japan is using less oil now than before, in an absolute sense.

So the case of Japan demonstrates that reducing absolute oil demand is possible over time. How does Japan do it? The short answer is with high fuel taxes and an emphasis at many levels on producing energy-efficient devices, particularly fuel-efficient cars (products that Japan then exports and sells in America, among other places).

Higher taxes on fuel at the gas pump in America would begin to do some of the trick of arresting growth in oil usage. But so far, politics in the United States have ruled out higher gasoline taxes even during the "cheap oil" days of the 1980s and 1990s.

I have heard intelligent people, including not a few politicians who are in a position to know better, describe it along the lines of "cheap gas is an American birthright." (To which I have a two-word response: "Peak Oil.")

So lacking a long-term approach to conserving a depleting asset, the default energy policy of the United States seems to be that the nation will buy and import a lot of oil from other nations, rather than pay high gas taxes.

This low-tax, high-demand situation in America sharply contrasts the energy situation in most other advanced economies on the world, particularly Europe and Japan (see above), where fuel taxes are hefty to say the least.

With low fuel taxes in the United States and high fuel taxes in Europe and Japan, it follows that the average fuel efficiency in the U.S. automobile fleet is somewhat less than half that of the automobile fleet in Europe. And the U.S. fuel-efficiency average is far less than half the average fuel efficiency of the Japanese automobile fleet.

This particular statistic concerning the comparative national average for fuel efficiency matters a lot when a nation uses as much gasoline every day as does America. Current U.S. daily gasoline demand is around 9.2 million barrels per day (it varies seasonally).

If the U.S. automobile fleet were just as efficient as the European fleet (a very big "if," but work with me on this), that usage number would be about 4.6 million barrels of gasoline per day.

But still, it is possible that increased fuel-efficiency alone could "save" half of the gasoline used in the United States every day. And consider that it takes two barrels of oil, on average, to refine into one barrel of gasoline.

So "saving" 4.6 million barrels of gasoline per day is the equivalent of daily reducing crude oil usage by 9.2 million barrels, in a world that produces and consumes about 84 million barrels of oil per day. So what you might want to label as "excessive" U.S. gasoline demand alone, based simply on considerations of low mileage, accounts for as much as 11% of the total daily world oil demand, or an amount equal to the anticipated daily oil demand of China in 2010 (U.S. Department of Energy estimate).

The economic and policy arguments do not stop there, however. Low automotive fuel efficiency in America directly leads to higher levels of oil imports, higher demand, higher posted prices, and far more U.S. dollars sent overseas to pay for oil.

In the aggregate, then, the United States is spending hundreds of billions of dollars overseas, and in essence "decapitalizing" itself, so that many millions of drivers can sit in their cars and idle in traffic jams every day. Can you really say that this is the "free market" at work? What would Clausewitz say? I think he would call it bad policy and abysmal energy strategy.

This abysmal oil situation is so bad that it must be a reflection of an inherent flaw in the political and policymaking process. The current situation is so self-destructive to the nation over the long term, and such obviously bad policy, that it could not otherwise occur if the nation were, let's say, at war.

(Oh, wait a minute. We are at war. Last I heard, it was going to be a "long war," according to the Quadrennial Defense Review.) Think about it. Any general who proposed a warfighting strategy equivalent to the current so-called "energy strategy" to political leaders would lose his stars and be ushered off to retirement in the Old Soldiers' Home.

Yet the policymakers in America move ahead as if by instinct, like moths to a flame, in an attempt to perpetuate a lost past receding before our eyes. (Well, OK, I admit that you have to understand how to view depletion at a global level. This is not for amateurs.)

And people in general wonder why they are less and less in control of their energy destiny, and bellyache that the nation is more and more at the mercy of the whims of other people in faroff places. The answer is as close as the driveway of the large house in the leafy suburb, many miles from the homeowner's place of employment, which is a state of affairs due in large measure part to a legacy of low fuel prices, if not low fuel taxes.

Score this latter point for Jim Kunstler, author of The Geography of Nowhere and The Long Emergency, who has been one of the most vocal and articulate commentators on the subject: One of Kunstler's key litmus tests for whether or not any politician "gets it" on Peak Oil is if the honcho supports reconstructing some semblance of an intercity passenger rail system in the United States. It would be great industrial policy, and we are going to need it. This would probably be a winning issue for the presidential election in 2008, if anyone were listening.

The foregoing is merely one out of innumerable examples of long-term energy folly in the United States. But it illustrates that point that you have to think back "up the chain" to the bad policy and even worse state of politics. It highlights the point that the politics of energy in the United States tend to be ill informed to the point of being ignorant and self-destructive. The energy policy that flows from such bad politics is disjointed.

And how can any sort of "winning" energy strategy (let alone a survival energy strategy in a world that may already be at Peak Oil) emerge from this kind of mess? Recall what I said in Parts I and II of this discussion, referring back to Clausewitz: "While a failure of tactics or operations can doom the entire chain, a failure of policy and strategy will doom the entire chain."

The New Strategic Realities of Energy

"Strategic Realities"? Sounds like a business school case, but that is not my focus. This discussion is more a mixture of graduate work in geology, plus a tour at an advanced war college. (Hint -- like the one located at Newport, R.I.) The economics of energy have been fundamentally altered by the geological reality of Peak Oil, coupled with world demographic trends toward more people using more oil.

These key factors change the economics of energy, and hence impact the politics of energy at the very highest levels, and at the level of national policy. In this respect, America is late to the game -- or should I say to "the great game."

There has been up till now a stubborn refusal in the United States to face the facts of the Peak Oil reality. At some point, mere negligence becomes gross negligence becomes willful misconduct.

With rare exceptions like Rep. Roscoe Bartlett of Maryland (a conservative Republican, by the way), "power" is failing to speak truth to the people. It is left, then, for people somehow to speak truth to power, not unlike Adm. Yamamoto to Premier Konoe in 1940.

This is why I believe that it is important to discuss energy in terms of developing a true "energy policy and strategy" approach to an oncoming future characterized by declining supplies of crude oil, dramatically higher costs for the stuff, and immensely more political friction both home and abroad. Nothing is going to get easier. And crafting the outlines of a continuously evolving national energy strategy is not a simple matter.

A sound energy strategy will have to be adaptable to the dynamics of constant change in a competitive world. One thing for certain is that there is no one-shot, cookbook "energy strategy" that if only you follow the recipe will forever maintain some happy status quo.

Look around the world and you will see many nations that consider their energy resources, and associated production and distribution systems strategic assets, to a scale not even comprehensible to most Americans.

These overseas resources and related systems are considered, by their owners, to require management through a deliberate planning process sharply focused on national energy security and long-range, sustainable access to energy resources.

This does not necessarily mean that some government entity owns every oil well and every refinery, although in some countries, that is the case. But it does mean that the policymakers within the respective governments have decided to concern their national policy apparatuses at a strategic level with the sources and uses of energy and to focus on aspects that are deemed to be critical, particularly in the arena of sustainability.

Sweden, for example, has a national plan to become oil independent within 20 years, mostly by eliminating demand for petroleum in its industries and society. The Swedes fully intend to remain a developed nation and to provide a high-level quality of life to the population. But they will do it without relying on other people's oil. Good for them. This is Swedish national policy, and the voters are coming onboard in ways that leave U.S. policy in the dust. Wow!

The list of other nations with what can only be termed "strategic plans" for their energy resources includes places that are important to the world of energy production and full of very intelligent people, despite any caricatures or stereotypes you may carry with you.

From Russia to Venezuela, from China to Iran, these are nations that have energy plans and policies and strategies for the 21st century. Some nations and plans may be better than others, but at least they have plans.

In America, there is a rather foolish tendency to belittle some of these other nations and their energy policies, if not to fear them. (Although, in the end, America winds up reacting to them.)

This is partly due to a poverty of imagination in the collective minds of U.S. leadership, such as when one member of Congress called the Swedes and their energy goals "quaint" and "not relevant" to the U.S. situation. I wonder if another high-ranking member of the U.S. government thinks that the Swedes are fortifying their "personal virtue" by striving to become oil independent within 20 years.

Oil independence is "not relevant"? Aggressive energy conservation measures are merely "personal virtue"? Famous last words, I suppose. This kind of thinking is pre-Peak Oil and all but endorses a national policy-by-default to foreclose any sense of adaptability to changes in the world of energy.

At the lofty levels of policymaking and strategy formulation, certainly concerning the future of energy supply for the United States and its allies in the world, there is no such thing as finality. The goal has to be to create a continuous process of policy-strategy formulation in the arena of energy that influences events such that things proceed to favor the interests of one party or another, and preferably favors our "side," if any side is going to prevail.

Couple the current U.S. poverty of imagination in the arena of strategy with the evident raw suspicion and belligerent opposition on the part of U.S. leadership when some foreign nations adopt policies that are confrontational to U.S. entities and interests.

Sometimes, the United States acts surprised when other nations act in their own self-interest, when for one reason or another it is America that has made itself vulnerable to the whims and caprices of others. So what is the answer going forward? Change policy? Remake national energy strategy? Or do we really think that we can, as the saying goes, just "bomb them all back to the Stone Age?" Has that ever worked before?

For now, suffice to say that there are people in high places in other nations engaged in deliberate energy planning and formulating energy policy and strategy in their own ways. They are moving their pieces about on the chessboards of the world. And despite whatever sense of motion you may see within the U.S. leadership cadre, my opinion is that U.S. energy policy and strategy is unfocused and inferior to that of certain other nations.

Speaking of moving chess pieces about on the chessboards of the world, remember that the word "checkmate" is derived from the Farsi language of Persia, today known as Iran. In Farsi, the expression "shah mat" translates to "the king is defeated." How is that for a fundamental "strategic" concept?

Until next time,

Byron W. King

Byron W. King is a practicing attorney in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with real clients and real law books on his shelves. After graduating from Harvard University more years ago than he cares to discuss, Byron worked as a geologist in the exploration and production division of a major international oil company. He has followed developments in the oil and gas industry for almost three decades. However, in the process of seeking more excitement than a man can safely obtain from flaring over-pressurized gas whipping out of a 21,000-foot well, Byron also served for many years in both the active and reserve components of the United States Navy.
While in the sea service, Byron logged more flight time in tactical jet aircraft than George W. Bush, as well as 127 more carrier landings than the recently-re-elected commander in chief. Among other assignments, Byron has served as a field historian with the Navy.
Byron looks at current events, economics, and politics through the lens of history. He brings to the table a unique perspective that incorporates many millions of years of the Earth’s geologic history, and blends its significance into the more recent, man-made kind of tale.

Sanctions against Iran

By
Honorable Congressman
Dr. Ron Paul

As the drumbeat for military action against Iran grows louder, some members of Congress are calling to expand the longstanding U.S. trade ban that bars American companies from investing in that nation. In fact, many war hawks in Washington are pushing for a comprehensive international embargo against Iran. The international response has been lukewarm, however, because the world needs Iranian oil. But we cannot underestimate the irrational, almost manic desire of some neoconservatives to attack Iran one way or another, even if it means crippling a major source of oil and destabilizing the worldwide economy.

Make no mistake about it: Economic sanctions are acts of aggression. Sanctions increase poverty and misery among the very poorest inhabitants of targeted nations, and they breed tremendous resentment against those imposing them. But they rarely hurt the political and economic elites responsible for angering American leaders in the first place.

In fact, few government policies are as destructive to our economy as the embargo.

While embargoes sound like strong, punitive action, in reality they represent a failed policy that four decades of experience prove doesn't work. Conversely, economic engagement is perhaps the single most effective tool in tearing down dictatorships and spreading the message of liberty.

It is important to note that economic engagement is not the same thing as foreign aid. Foreign aid, which should be abolished immediately, involves the US government spending American tax dollars to prop up other nations.

Embargoes only hurt the innocent of a targeted country. While it may be difficult for the leader of an embargoed nation to get a box of American-grown rice, he will get it one way or another. For the poor peasant in the remote section of his country, however, the food will be unavailable.

It is difficult to understand how denying access to food, medicine, and other products benefits anyone. Embargo advocates claim that denying people access to our products somehow creates opposition to the despised leader. The reality, though, is that hostilities are more firmly directed at America.

Father Robert Sirico, a Paulist priest, wrote in the Wall Street Journal that trade relations "strengthen people's loyalties to each other and weaken government power." To imagine that we somehow can spread the message of liberty to an oppressed nation by denying them access to our people and the bounty of our prosperity is contorted at best.

For more than thirty years we have embargoed Cuba in an attempt to drive Fidel Castro from power. Yet he remains in power. By contrast look at the Soviet Union, a nation we allowed our producers to engage economically. Of course the Soviet Union has collapsed.

Embargoes greatly harm our citizens. As the American agricultural industry continues to develop new technology to reduce costs and increase yields, it becomes more important for farmers and ranchers to find markets outside the United States to sell their goods so they can make ends meet. By preventing our farmers and ranchers from competing in the world market, we deny them very profitable opportunities.

Government meddling is always destructive to the free market; people inevitably will make wiser decisions about how to spend their money, with whom, and when, than politicians in Washington. Embargoes simply do not accomplish the ends advocates claim to desire, and are extremely harmful to the well-being of Americans.


Dr. Ron Paul

Congressman Ron Paul of Texas enjoys a national reputation as the premier advocate for liberty in politics today. Dr. Paul is the leading spokesman in Washington for limited constitutional government, low taxes, free markets, and a return to sound monetary policies based on commodity-backed currency. He is known among both his colleagues in Congress and his constituents for his consistent voting record in the House of Representatives: Dr. Paul never votes for legislation unless the proposed measure is expressly authorized by the Constitution. In the words of former Treasury Secretary William Simon, Dr. Paul is the "one exception to the Gang of 535" on Capitol Hill.

Dr. Paul is the author of several books, including Challenge to Liberty; The Case for Gold; and A Republic, If You Can Keep It. He has been a distinguished counselor to the Ludwig von Mises Institute, and is widely quoted by scholars and writers in the fields of monetary policy, banking, and political economy. He has received many awards and honors during his career in Congress, from organizations such as the National Taxpayers Union, Citizens Against Government Waste, the Council for a Competitive Economy, Young Americans for Freedom, and countless others.

Dr. Paul's consistent voting record prompted one Congressman to comment that "Ron Paul personifies the Founding Fathers' ideal of the citizen-statesman. He makes it clear that his principles will never be compromised, and they never are." Another Congresswoman added that "There are few people in public life who, through thick and thin, rain or shine, stick to their principles. Ron Paul is one of those few."

Planning, Policy, Strategy and Energy, Part II

by Byron King

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IN PART I of this article, I discussed Karl von Clausewitz, and his important study of policy and strategy, On War, published in 1832. Clausewitz was reviewing the Napoleonic Wars through the lens of policy and strategy, but his ideas have broader scope than just the martial arena.

In his discussions of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz was, of course, reviewing military history. But he was not writing simply for the sake of allowing his readers to enjoy the vicarious experience of war, the whiz and zip of flying bullets and the acrid smell of gunpowder clogging their nostrils.

Clausewitz was engaging in an exercise of high-level critical thinking. He was not just examining the conduct and methodology of waging war. Clausewitz was focusing on the complex interaction of changing variables over time.

In Part I of this article, I mentioned that according to Clausewitz, policy, strategy, operations, and tactics are a continuum. I summarized one of Clausewitz's key points as being that while a failure of tactics or operations can doom the entire chain, a failure of policy and strategy will doom the entire chain.

I advised you to keep the "failure of policy" and "failure of strategy" ideas in mind because we see these a lot, throughout history and certainly in current events.

A Few Words on Politics, Policy, Strategy, and Energy

I am discussing all of this because the United States needs to start thinking, and thinking very hard, about developing a "national energy strategy" in a pure sense. In Part I and in the preceding paragraphs here, I began to refer to policy and strategy in the context of Clausewitz and of warfighting.

I am using Clausewitz as the rhetorical guide to the concepts of policy and strategy. The only reason that I am now using Clausewitz in connection with energy strategy is that his application of policy and strategic concepts to the study of the Napoleonic Wars helps to crystallize thinking about the basic strategic terms. That is, the strategic concept is applicable to energy issues as well.

If you follow the continuum of Clausewitz, then politics and policy come before strategy. So perhaps we have to ask what is the appropriate energy policy for the United States? Or moving further up the line, what are the politics of energy?

These are loaded and emotional questions, particularly in a nation with the energy consumption history of America.

I have been discussing this back and forth over the months with my colleague at Agora Financial, Dan Denning, who made a good point. Dan noted that up until the present time, no U.S. national energy policy has had any true sense of strategic urgency, let alone any staying power.

Sure, it has always been fun and political sport to beat up on oil companies, going back to the days of Titusville. But a long-term national energy strategy? Not in America, and for a lot of reasons.

Back to the Future in the 1970s

The only time that energy became a fundamental issue of U.S. policy was back in the 1970s. That was when U.S. oil production peaked, imports started to accelerate upward, and energy prices rose dramatically after the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Due to a nominal "embargo" against the United States, sponsored by the Arab nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the politics of energy became more than apparent in 1974, embodied in public dissatisfaction with long lines for scarce gasoline.

What passed for a U.S. energy policy followed the gasoline lines, mostly in terms of new federal laws and regulations concerning energy use and production. For example, there was bipartisan political support for energy conservation measures such as tax breaks for insulating homes and even mandating automakers to increase the fuel efficiency of their products. The United States determined to establish its Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Also, there was federal sponsorship of research into alternative energy systems such as coal conversion and oil shale development, among many other energy options. A lot of things happened in America in the 1970s with respect to energy conservation, and a lot of those things were at what could be characterized as a "strategic" level, and basically good for the nation over the long haul.

Still, much of what occurred in the 1970s seems in retrospect to have been a response to clever lobbying at the federal political level by well-connected interest groups, and U.S. knee-jerk reactions to singular events and geopolitical machinations by other parties in other nations.

That is, what passed for U.S. energy strategy was along the lines of maintaining a happy, yet receding, status quo, not the creation of a continuous process of influencing and shaping events toward an energy future that would be marked by radical change.

The events at Three Mile Island, for example, stand alone as a sharp, high-G turning point on the U.S. collective view of nuclear power, a view that has taken almost two generations to start to change.

Meanwhile, the United States embarked on a massive program to generate electricity using natural gas, which one knowledgeable commentator likens to "turning gold into lead." And even the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 was viewed by many policymakers as a geopolitical event that was the proximate cause of oil price increases in 1979 and 1980, not as a harbinger of an energy-short future.

Looking back, it seems as though little of either the politics or policy toward energy in the United States during the 1970s was premised on a clear understanding of the underlying physical reality of the eventual impending decline in conventional oil production.

As far back as 1956, the great geologist M. King Hubbert made public his mathematically determined prediction of the "peaking" of domestic U.S. oil production, and his prediction came true for the United States in 1970 (although it only became clear in hindsight).

As the 1970s progressed, this Hubbert school of thought was distinctly a minority viewpoint, certainly much less prevalent than even the current Peak Oil school. After leaving the employ of Shell Oil, Hubbert worked for the U.S. Geological Survey, lectured at many schools, and was for a time a visiting professor at MIT.

Yes, Hubbert's argument was out there, but was a distant voice in the wilderness. Hubbert's seminar at no less an institution than Harvard University in 1977 attracted all of about a dozen people, one of whom was me.

In the 1970s, whenever some people would speak of limits to the ultimate levels of oil production, others as often as not would sneer and label the discussion derisively "Club of Rome" thinking. In all fairness, U.S. leadership and policymakers had other things to worry about, like surviving the Cold War, and losing the Vietnam War.

And it is not out of line to note that the festering cultural Marxism within much of U.S. politics in the 1970s foreclosed intelligent thinking at many levels (both then and now, I should add). but that is another discussion for another time.

It is interesting that one of the most prescient discussions of the world's energy future was presented in the 1970s not by any senior leader or policymaker of the U.S. political or business establishment, Democrat or Republican, but by the great science fiction writer Isaac Asimov.

Best known for such classic science fiction works as the Foundation series and I, Robot, Asimov gave his prophetic lecture in 1974 entitled "The Future of Humanity." Here is the link to the rather astonishing text if you are interested: http://www.asimovonline.com/oldsite/future_of_humanity.html.

Back to the Future in the 1980s and Beyond

The political and policy debate of the 1970s led in the 1980s to what passed for a national political consensus (well, what passes for "national consensus" in a vast nation like America) that no long-term national energy mobilization was necessary. Simply put, the "energy policy" was to drill for oil at home and buy more oil from abroad. (For the record, I was working for Gulf Oil Co. back then, and we drilled like gangbusters.)

When all else fails, the policy was to have a strong Navy and powerful expeditionary ground force and Air Force that could dominate events in the Persian Gulf. QED, right?

Looking back at it, the lack of any sense of urgency in crafting some sort of U.S. energy policy is not incomprehensible. By the 1980s, America had a diversified supply chain of domestic and offshore oil suppliers and the price of crude oil was serendipitously falling due to the opening up of new oil provinces like Alaska and the North Sea.

For a good many years, America had seemingly found its happy means to preserve the beloved status quo, seen in a relatively low price for gasoline at the pump. The voters were calm. The underlying politics was ill informed, if not delusional.

Despite the price spike in oil occasioned by the Gulf War of 1991, this fanciful U.S. view of its seemingly secure -- and cornucopian -- energy base lasted through the decade of the 1990s as well, during the "waking up from history" period and into the new millennium. Over time, the shale oil projects of the 1970s were shuttered.

The SUVs of the 1990s took to the roads by storm. And like the gold-laden galleons of another age, the oil tankers docked at U.S. ports with their precious cargoes of black treasure sloshing in the holds and pressing down upon the keels.

From a political and policy standpoint, it seemed that the factors behind any increase in energy prices in the 1980s, 1990s, and into the 2000s were temporary and political, not permanent and physical. Price spike?

It was the market at work. It was the manipulations of evil oil-traders, or some one-off military event like the "Tanker War" of the mid-1980s in the Persian Gulf. Give it time, and "Old Mr. Market" would get those pesky prices back down. To the extent that there was an energy strategy in all of this, it was to perpetuate the myths of the past.

And anyway, strategy or no, the traditional economic view in America is that "free markets" are better at allocating the resources of society than government regulation or planning. This despite the fact that the U.S. dollar is a "managed" currency, the price and quantity and quality of which are set by the Federal Reserve.

And this despite the fact that U.S. federal and state governments have heavily regulated most large-scale business activities for over a century, down to the former Interstate Commerce Commission setting the prices and tariffs for bus tickets.

And of course, up to 40%, by some estimates, of U.S. gross domestic product is the result of government spending at the federal, state, and local levels. So how "free" is such a free market, anyhow? To paraphrase a former U.S. president, "I guess it depends on what your definition of the word 'free' is."

Is the "Free Market" a Strategy?

Americans have a lot of confidence in the so-called "free market" as a mechanism to permit the nation to mobilize and meet challenges. But I have to wonder out loud if this is based mostly on wishful thinking and outdated nostalgia about what occurred in the run-up to and during World War II. Like dried-up has-been movie stars recalling their glory days on the silver screen of old, Americans have read too many of their own press releases about being the "arsenal of democracy."

Or is this kind of self-promotion just a reflection of a national characteristic, originating in a nation and culture that uses the mighty U.S. dollar as its currency, which currency is also fortuitously the world's "reserve currency." After all, it is easy to write checks if nobody ever comes to the teller window to cash them.

During World War II, America had tremendous wealth in both natural resources and capital stock, including being almost self-sufficient in oil production. (America was a net oil exporter until 1943.) Politically, the war allowed the central government to, in essence, hijack the national industrial base and orient it toward fighting a war on two fronts, on opposite sides of the planet. It was an immense undertaking.

From a policy standpoint, the key challenge for the American war planners was to figure out the most efficient ways to reorient national production to support the war policy and defeat the Axis powers.

Lack of resources, such as energy resources and other raw materials, labor, and especially credit, was not a significant factor in the American war effort. (And when it comes to modern military affairs, the U.S. Department of Defense still tends to get what it wants, particularly if the item is manufactured in a range of states and congressional districts. This is another topic for another time.)

I am by no means arguing that World War II was easy. The Second World War was an immense national effort, probably unique in all of human history, and certainly in U.S. history. But there were no real constraints or limitations at the level of domestic war production.

After all, there were no fleets of German bombers flattening U.S. cities, as was the case in many other countries in the world. And there was plenty of energy with which to keep the lights on and the furnaces burning down at the mills.

By 1944, the United States could summon its allies at Bretton Woods, N.H., to forge (some say, to rubber stamp) the future monetary arrangements for the world, with the U.S. dollar as the linchpin. It is not overstatement to say that by mid-1943 it was all but a foregone conclusion that U.S. warfighting policy, and its implementing strategy, would prevail.

Japan's Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto understood and believed this as far back as 1940 and in so many words famously said almost exactly that to Japan's premier that year. The bottom line was that the U.S. economy had the capacity to provide the theater commanders and generals and admirals -- not to mention the fighting elements of numerous allies, from Britain to China to the Soviet Union -- with the tools they needed to win the war. And so it happened.

The most difficult questions, certainly for the U.S. political and military leadership at senior levels, revolved around where and when to deploy the blood and treasure of the nation most effectively in a military sense. It was the hardest of calculus. For example, the invasion of Europe was delayed due to the need for landing craft in the Pacific Theater.

So hundreds of thousands of Russian troops died on their own German front, and Stalin fumed and raged while the D-day invasion of France was postponed again and again. But at the same time, the United States could send 1,000-plane air raids against German cities, tying up a million German air defense troops and tens of thousands of German guns and aircraft.

For an example from the Pacific Theater, the invasion of Iwo Jima occurred because the Army Air Corps wanted that particular island as a strategic base on which battle-damaged and fuel-short B-29s, valuable airplanes full of highly trained aircrews, could land on the way back from bombing Japan.

Thus, thousands of Marines died capturing Iwo Jima from fierce Japanese resistance. By the grim math of war, eventually, the deaths of these Marines saved the lives of more thousands of U.S. aircrew. As I said above, this was a hard sort of calculus.

At this D-day and long-range bombing level of strategic and operational planning, there were damn few clear-cut choices and no easy ones. But one of the few luxuries available to the war planners was not to have to worry much about from where the next barrels of black oil would come.

We will continue this discussion in Part III of this article. Thank you for reading Whiskey & Gunpowder.

Until we meet again...

Byron W. King

Byron W. King is a practicing attorney in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with real clients and real law books on his shelves. After graduating from Harvard University more years ago than he cares to discuss, Byron worked as a geologist in the exploration and production division of a major international oil company. He has followed developments in the oil and gas industry for almost three decades. However, in the process of seeking more excitement than a man can safely obtain from flaring over-pressurized gas whipping out of a 21,000-foot well, Byron also served for many years in both the active and reserve components of the United States Navy.
While in the sea service, Byron logged more flight time in tactical jet aircraft than George W. Bush, as well as 127 more carrier landings than the recently-re-elected commander in chief. Among other assignments, Byron has served as a field historian with the Navy.
Byron looks at current events, economics, and politics through the lens of history. He brings to the table a unique perspective that incorporates many millions of years of the Earth’s geologic history, and blends its significance into the more recent, man-made kind of tale.

Planning, Policy, Strategy and Energy, Part I

by Byron W. King
for Whiskey & Gunpowder
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A COUPLE OF months ago, I wrote an article in Whiskey & Gunpowder entitled "Things Just Got Worse" (Jan. 25, 2006) concerning a major downward revision to the estimate of oil reserves in Kuwait. My sense of doom and gloom was prompted because if the downward revisions to the Kuwait numbers are true, the world's total proven oil reserves just decreased by around 50 billion barrels, or 5%.

But why be gloomy about losing something you do not really have? (Well, for starters, doom and gloom is stock-in-trade at Agora Financial. We have made a lot of money being gloomy and doomy in recent years.) If the oil was never there, then it was never there. These lost oil reserves were only phony baloney bookkeeping entries, and just a reflection of the exceedingly creative accounting that goes on within many of the world's oil-exporting nations. These downward revisions were not real oil in real rocks, right? How much can you miss what was never there in the first place? Is it really a crime to rob an empty bank?

And following the logic of "not missing" something that was never really there, let's ask the next question. Does it matter, over any period of time, not to have something that was never there?

Anyone who understands the nature of the oil industry can assure you that the downward revision to the Kuwaiti reserve numbers will not create a problem tomorrow or next week or next month. So don't worry. The oil that you will use tomorrow, next week, or next month has already been pumped from the ground, shipped via tanker or pipeline, refined in a refinery somewhere, and is in transit to your local gas station.

Even the oil that you will use next year is well identified and understood. That is, there is an oil field somewhere in this world, with oil wells that are lifting product out of the ground in a predictable fashion. And some of that oil has your name on it. All you have to do is let the global oil industry do its global oil-thing and then pay for it at the gas pump. Nothing short of a major war in the Middle East will interfere. OK, maybe you should worry a little bit.

But what about the longer term? Does the downward revision matter over the next five, 10, or 20 years? The short answer is yes. Now is the time to worry more, because when the equivalent of 5% of the world's oil reserves simply vanishes from the ledger books, it makes for a problem even if it was just "phantom oil." The unavailability of this oil, real or no, will have a severe impact in what are called the "out years." Why is this so? Because whatever amounts of long-term reserves we thought were down in the ground are no longer on the books, and no longer available. We thought these reserves were there, but now they are gone. Puff of smoke, stroke of a pen, presto, the reserves are gone. In so many words, this screws up the planning.

Planning for Peak Oil

Planning? What is "planning" anyhow? Like the weather, everybody talks about planning. But what does it mean to "plan" something? It makes for an interesting term, and an even more interesting concept.

On a personal level, most people have some sort of a plan for their life. (What, you don't have a plan for your life? Actually, you do, but you just don't know it yet.) The plan might be pretty basic, along the lines of go to school, learn a skill or trade, get a job, get married, have kids, whatever. Or maybe the plan is more complex. It is up to you, after all. Do you want to run for president of the United States? Or maybe just run away and join the circus? Be my guest. Things may work out one way, or they may work out another way. But you ought to do whatever you think you can do and give life a try. Good luck.

On a scale larger than just a single individual, families plan, and groups of people plan. Organizations plan. Businesses plan. Governments plan. Nations plan. But let's go beyond colloquial discussion and get into the philosophical roots of the term. When it comes to Peak Oil, the concept of planning takes on a rather overarching meaning. "In the long run, we are all dead," said Lord Keynes, speaking of government deficit spending and national debts.

When it comes to Peak Oil, however, the "long run" may arrive sooner than we think. Princeton University's most famous Peak Oil man, professor Kenneth Deffeyes (author of the highly acclaimed and readable books Hubbert's Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage and the sequel, Beyond Oil: The View From Hubbert's Peak) recently stated that he believes that world oil production "peaked" in December 2005. Whoops.

So if you have not made your plans for life in a post-Peak Oil world, you are showing up late and the excitement has started without you. But then again, there is no time like the present, and it behooves you to be concerned about the issue now. After all, as the saying goes, "The future is now." (Although people also say things like "the good old days are today." So apparently, "The good old days are today," but so is "the future," because it is "now." So both the future and the past come together in the present. And remember, "Tomorrow is another day." It gets kind of confusing, I know.)

The Long Emergency

Speaking of the "good old days" and "the future is now," if you subscribe to James Kunstler and the viewpoint he expressed in his May 2005 book The Long Emergency, you had better start planning now for a very bleak future. Kunstler is a brilliant writer who postulates a world not too far down the path of time in which there is far less energy availability leading to profound societal changes, most of them negative compared with today. This will lead to smaller human populations living in radically different conditions than we see at present.

According to Kunstler, it is not just that people will be forced by circumstances in a post-Peak Oil world to abandon unsustainable mega-cities, especially desert enclaves like Las Vegas and Phoenix. People will also, for the most part, have to abandon the surrounding and unsustainable "asteroid belts" of mega-suburbs. These refugees from modernity will, if they are lucky, move to small towns. And no, this is not some happy vision of future life going on in endless replays of Mayberry, USA. Kunstler actually envisions human existence reverting to conditions similar to what prevailed in medieval times. Kunstler's futuristic book is rather shocking, in large part because his arguments are so factual and logical.

The Coming Break Point

If, on the other hand, you believe Peter Tertzakian and the viewpoint in his December 2005 book A Thousand Barrels a Second: The Coming Oil Break Point and the Challenges Facing an Energy Dependent World, the future will follow economic trends similar to those of the past several centuries. Tertzakian, a former geophysicist who worked for Chevron Corp., understands the thesis of Peak Oil. He has read most, if not all, of the currently available books, and cites them appropriately. He refers knowledgeably to the Hubbert school of thought and explains the basic thesis of impending irreversible decline in crude oil production with much clarity, and I would expect no less from someone with his technical background.

When it comes to Peak Oil, Tertzakian understands what is going on, and he is right upfront about predicting that there will be significant future price increases due to oil shortage and scarcity. But Tertzakian also believes in the profit motive, and in the promise of innovation via human ingenuity. He argues that these future price increases will serve as loud economic signals for mankind to find resources and technology with which to substitute for scarce and expensive liquid hydrocarbons.

Tertzakian refers frequently and cogently in his book to the historical transition from whale oil to rock oil for purposes of illumination in an industrial age, and from wood to coal for the energy to run the machines of industry. He discusses the rise of electricity as a source of energy in the late 19th and into the 20th centuries. He correctly cites a lot of the history of the growth of the oil industry, including some great tales of oil patch. He makes a lot of good points about future energy use patterns of both the developed and developing world. Central among Tertzakian's points is his take on the nature of the impending and profound change in the sources of materials that mankind will use in the future for heating, lighting, and transportation.

Tertzakian foresees the peak in the Peak Oil argument, and forecasts his version of how the future facts of life will alter peoples' energy use, if not their patterns of social behavior. To this end, Tertzakian identifies so-called historical "break points" during which mankind has in the past made a series of transitions from one kind of energy source to the next. But, and Tertzakian notes this, it is not as if one energy resource entirely replaces the other. People used to burn wood and still burn wood. Despite the rise of oil as a source for liquid fuel, the world still burns a lot of coal. We all live better with electricity, but still use a lot of oil. So, Tertzakian notes, the following energy source does not totally eclipse the previous energy source (except in the case of whale oil).

And when it comes to Peak Oil, in essence, Tertzakian predicts that high-volume usage of conventional oil will decline and rising prices will signal and usher in the next energy-usage "break point." People will adapt to the new circumstances. Economic activities will rebalance to higher prices and less availability of oil. The energy otherwise derived from today's use of oil will be replaced in the future with some other form of energy production, as well as by changes in use patterns. So sayeth Tertzakian.

Two Books, Published Between May and December

So to paraphrase the words of the old Frank Sinatra song, do you subscribe to Kunstler's book, published in May? Or to Tertzakian's book, from December? "It's a long, long while from May to December, but the days grow short when you reach September." These two highly regarded and very knowledgeable authors both acknowledge the Peak Oil thesis. Both forecast a radical decline in future availability of large volumes of today's version of conventional crude oil. Both authors see prices rising dramatically. But the two authors also offer radically divergent views of the future.

In Kunstler's view, people will be living a restrictive, and vastly local sort of existence, in many cases in small enclaves. Much of life, for most people, will be spent struggling to eke out an existence by growing food in poor soil under all but medieval circumstances.

In Tertzakian's view, on the other hand, people will pay more for energy. But the supplies will be there, courtesy of innovative technology and the utilization of other energy resources. People will certainly complain more about paying more for energy (gee, what a surprise), but most people will retain some semblance of what we consider today to be a Western standard of living.

The two forecast futures could hardly be more different. To paraphrase the old carnival saying, "You pays your money at the bookstore, and you takes your choice."

Of course, Kunstler and Tertzakian are not alone in their willingness to tackle the Peak Oil issue with their respective great insights and good writing. Lately, more and more people are writing about Peak Oil and discussing the related issues, and to varying degrees of understanding, if not misunderstanding. Not long ago (March 1, 2006, to be exact), none other than The New York Times actually endorsed the Peak Oil thesis, and hence the term has now become respectable in the mainstream media. Still, Peak Oil is far from being headlined on "American Idol" or in commercials during the Super Bowl, although the word is getting out. So onward goes the debate.

A Few Words on Politics, Policy, and Strategy

At the beginning of this article, I discussed planning in a general sense. And for my money, at the bookstore, I think that now is the time to discuss policy and strategy in general. What is policy and strategy? What do these things look like? How does one formulate policy and strategy? Is it the same process as "planning"? Is it something else entirely? My experience is that while a lot of people talk about policy and strategy, few have a real understanding of the roots of the concepts. The terms "policy" and "strategy" get confused in conversational language. People substitute strategy for what they really intend to say in a discussion of policy, which is at a higher level than strategy -- if not discussing operations or operational plans, or tactics, which are at a lower level than strategy.

In this regard, I am following the logic of the great theorist of policy and strategy, Karl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz's seminal book On War, published in the pre-oil age days of 1832, analyzed policy and strategy from a military standpoint and in the context of dissecting the Napoleonic Wars. On War has been described as "turgid" by some commentators and the many war college students across the world who have been assigned to read the book over the past century or so, but once you get used to the style, it reads like Gone With the Wind. (OK, I am kind of kidding about the Gone With the Wind thing.) And my point in bringing this up is that the essence of Clausewitz's work transcends the martial sphere.

Basically, according to Clausewitz, politics sets the tone for policy, although politics and policy are the same word in Clausewitz's original German. Policy then sets the stage for strategy, which is a key point. Speaking of war, Clausewitz said, "No one starts a war -- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so -- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." This is, at root, an expression of how policy must drive strategy, and how strategy must mesh with policy directives and controls. This kind of thinking applies to any great endeavor, not just to waging wars.

Strategy, in turn, governs operations. This means that there is a distinction between strategy and the substrategic, subordinate level of operational art (although Clausewitz did not say this in so many words). Policy controls strategy. Strategy drives operations. And last but not least, tactics are necessary to carry out and achieve operational goals.

Thus, policy, strategy, operations, and tactics are a continuum.

And while a failure of tactics or operations can doom the entire chain, a failure of policy and strategy will also doom the entire chain. Keep that "failure of policy" and "failure of strategy" idea in mind. You see this a lot throughout history, and certainly in current events.

We will pick up on this discussion in Part II.

Regards,

Byron

Byron W. King is a practicing attorney in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with real clients and real law books on his shelves. After graduating from Harvard University more years ago than he cares to discuss, Byron worked as a geologist in the exploration and production division of a major international oil company. He has followed developments in the oil and gas industry for almost three decades. However, in the process of seeking more excitement than a man can safely obtain from flaring over-pressurized gas whipping out of a 21,000-foot well, Byron also served for many years in both the active and reserve components of the United States Navy.
While in the sea service, Byron logged more flight time in tactical jet aircraft than George W. Bush, as well as 127 more carrier landings than the recently-re-elected commander in chief. Among other assignments, Byron has served as a field historian with the Navy.
Byron looks at current events, economics, and politics through the lens of history. He brings to the table a unique perspective that incorporates many millions of years of the Earth’s geologic history, and blends its significance into the more recent, man-made kind of tale.

Iran: The Next Neocon Target

HON. RON PAUL OF TEXAS
Before the U.S. House of Representatives

April 5, 2006

It’s been three years since the U.S. launched its war against Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. Of course now almost everybody knows there were no WMDs, and Saddam Hussein posed no threat to the United States. Though some of our soldiers serving in Iraq still believe they are there because Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11, even the administration now acknowledges there was no connection. Indeed, no one can be absolutely certain why we invaded Iraq. The current excuse, also given for staying in Iraq, is to make it a democratic state, friendly to the United States. There are now fewer denials that securing oil supplies played a significant role in our decision to go into Iraq and stay there. That certainly would explain why U.S. taxpayers are paying such a price to build and maintain numerous huge, permanent military bases in Iraq. They’re also funding a new billion dollar embassy- the largest in the world.

The significant question we must ask ourselves is: What have we learned from three years in Iraq? With plans now being laid for regime change in Iran, it appears we have learned absolutely nothing. There still are plenty of administration officials who daily paint a rosy picture of the Iraq we have created. But I wonder: If the past three years were nothing more than a bad dream, and our nation suddenly awakened, how many would, for national security reasons, urge the same invasion? Would we instead give a gigantic sigh of relief that it was only a bad dream, that we need not relive the three-year nightmare of death, destruction, chaos and stupendous consumption of tax dollars. Conceivably we would still see oil prices under $30 a barrel, and most importantly, 20,000 severe U.S. causalities would not have occurred. My guess is that 99% of all Americans would be thankful it was only a bad dream, and would never support the invasion knowing what we know today.

Even with the horrible results of the past three years, Congress is abuzz with plans to change the Iranian government. There is little resistance to the rising clamor for “democratizing” Iran, even though their current president, Mahmoud Almadinejad, is an elected leader. Though Iran is hardly a perfect democracy, its system is far superior to most of our Arab allies about which we never complain. Already the coordinating propaganda has galvanized the American people against Iran for the supposed threat it poses to us with weapons of mass destruction that are no more present than those Saddam Hussein was alleged to have had. It’s amazing how soon after being thoroughly discredited over the charges levied against Saddam Hussein the Neo-cons are willing to use the same arguments against Iran. It’s frightening to see how easily Congress, the media, and the people accept many of the same arguments against Iran that were used to justify an invasion of Iraq.

Since 2001 we have spent over $300 billion, and occupied two Muslim nations--Afghanistan and Iraq. We’re poorer but certainly not safer for it. We invaded Afghanistan to get Osama bin Laden, the ring leader behind 9/11. This effort has been virtually abandoned. Even though the Taliban was removed from power in Afghanistan, most of the country is now occupied and controlled by warlords who manage a drug trade bigger than ever before. Removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan actually served the interests of Iran, the Taliban’s arch enemy, more than our own.

The longtime Neo-con goal to remake Iraq prompted us to abandon the search for Osama bin Laden. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was hyped as a noble mission, justified by misrepresentations of intelligence concerning Saddam Hussein and his ability to attack us and his neighbors. This failed policy has created the current chaos in Iraq-- chaos that many describe as a civil war. Saddam Hussein is out of power and most people are pleased. Yet some Iraqis, who dream of stability, long for his authoritarian rule. But once again, Saddam Hussein’s removal benefited the Iranians, who consider Saddam Hussein an arch enemy.

Our obsession with democracy-- which is clearly conditional, when one looks at our response to the recent Palestinian elections-- will allow the majority Shia to claim leadership title if Iraq’s election actually leads to an organized government. This delights the Iranians, who are close allies of the Iraqi Shia.

Talk about unintended consequences! This war has produced chaos, civil war, death and destruction, and huge financial costs. It has eliminated two of Iran’s worst enemies and placed power in Iraq with Iran’s best friends. Even this apparent failure of policy does nothing to restrain the current march toward a similar confrontation with Iran. What will it take for us to learn from our failures?

Common sense tells us the war in Iraq soon will spread to Iran. Fear of imaginary nuclear weapons or an incident involving Iran-- whether planned or accidental-- will rally the support needed for us to move on Muslim country #3. All the past failures and unintended consequences will be forgotten.

Even with deteriorating support for the Iraq war, new information, well planned propaganda, or a major incident will override the skepticism and heartache of our frustrating fight. Vocal opponents of an attack on Iran again will be labeled unpatriotic, unsupportive of the troops, and sympathetic to Iran’s radicals.

Instead of capitulating to these charges, we should point out that those who maneuver us into war do so with little concern for our young people serving in the military, and theoretically think little of their own children if they have any. It’s hard to conceive that political supporters of the war would consciously claim that a pre-emptive war for regime change, where young people are sacrificed, is only worth it if the deaths and injuries are limited to other people’s children. This, I’m sure, would be denied-- which means their own children are technically available for this sacrifice that is so often praised and glorified for the benefit of the families who have lost so much. If so, they should think more of their own children. If this is not so, and their children are not available for such sacrifice, the hypocrisy is apparent. Remember, most Neo-con planners fall into the category of chicken-hawks.

For the past 3 years it’s been inferred that if one is not in support of the current policy, one is against the troops and supports the enemy. Lack of support for the war in Iraq was said to be supportive of Saddam Hussein and his evil policies. This is an insulting and preposterous argument. Those who argued for the containment of the Soviets were never deemed sympathetic to Stalin or Khrushchev. Lack of support for the Iraq war should never be used as an argument that one was sympathetic to Saddam Hussein. Containment and diplomacy are far superior to confronting a potential enemy, and are less costly and far less dangerous-- especially when there’s no evidence that our national security is being threatened.

Although a large percentage of the public now rejects the various arguments for the Iraq war, 3 years ago they were easily persuaded by the politicians and media to fully support the invasion. Now, after 3 years of terrible pain for so many, even the troops are awakening from their slumber and sensing the fruitlessness of our failing effort. Seventy-two percent of our troops now serving in Iraq say it’s time to come home, yet the majority still cling to the propaganda that we’re there because of 9/11 attacks, something even the administration has ceased to claim. Propaganda is pushed on our troops to exploit their need to believe in a cause that’s worth the risk to life and limb.

I smell an expanded war in the Middle East, and pray that I’m wrong. I sense that circumstances will arise that demand support regardless of the danger and cost. Any lack of support, once again, will be painted as being soft on terrorism and al Qaeda. We will be told we must support Israel, support patriotism, support the troops, and defend freedom. The public too often only smells the stench of war after the killing starts. Public objection comes later on, but eventually it helps to stop the war. I worry that before we can finish the war we’re in and extricate ourselves, the patriotic fervor for expanding into Iran will drown out the cries of, “enough already!”

The agitation and congressional resolutions painting Iran as an enemy about to attack us have already begun. It’s too bad we can’t learn from our mistakes.

This time there will be a greater pretense of an international effort sanctioned by the UN before the bombs are dropped. But even without support from the international community, we should expect the plan for regime change to continue. We have been forewarned that “all options” remain on the table. And there’s little reason to expect much resistance from Congress. So far there’s less resistance expressed in Congress for taking on Iran than there was prior to going into Iraq. It’s astonishing that after three years of bad results and tremendous expense there’s little indication we will reconsider our traditional non-interventionist foreign policy. Unfortunately, regime change, nation building, policing the world, and protecting “our oil” still constitute an acceptable policy by the leaders of both major parties.

It’s already assumed by many in Washington I talk to that Iran is dead serious about obtaining a nuclear weapon, and is a much more formidable opponent than Iraq. Besides, Mahmoud Almadinjad threatened to destroy Israel and that cannot stand. Washington sees Iran as a greater threat than Iraq ever was, a threat that cannot be ignored.

Iran’s history is being ignored, just as we ignored Iraq’s history. This ignorance or deliberate misrepresentation of our recent relationship to Iraq and Iran is required to generate the fervor needed to attack once again a country that poses no threat to us. Our policies toward Iran have been more provocative than those towards Iraq. Yes, President Bush labeled Iran part of the axis of evil and unnecessarily provoked their anger at us. But our mistakes with Iran started a long time before this president took office.

In 1953 our CIA, with help of the British, participated in overthrowing the democratic elected leader, Mohamed Mossedech. We placed the Shah in power. He ruled ruthlessly but protected our oil interests, and for that we protected him-- that is until 1979. We even provided him with Iran’s first nuclear reactor. Evidently we didn’t buy the argument that his oil supplies precluded a need for civilian nuclear energy. From 1953 to 1979 his authoritarian rule served to incite a radical Muslim opposition led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, who overthrew the Shah and took our hostages in 1979. This blowback event was slow in coming, but Muslims have long memories. The hostage crisis and overthrow of the Shah by the Ayatollah was a major victory for the radical Islamists. Most Americans either never knew about or easily forgot our unwise meddling in the internal affairs of Iran in 1953.

During the 1980s we further antagonized Iran by supporting the Iraqis in their invasion of Iran. This made our relationship with Iran worse, while sending a message to Saddam Hussein that invading a neighboring country is not all that bad. When Hussein got the message from our State Department that his plan to invade Kuwait was not of much concern to the United States he immediately proceeded to do so. We in a way encouraged him to do it almost like we encouraged him to go into Iran. Of course this time our reaction was quite different, and all of a sudden our friendly ally Saddam Hussein became our arch enemy. The American people may forget this flip-flop, but those who suffered from it never forget. And the Iranians remember well our meddling in their affairs. Labeling the Iranians part of the axis of evil further alienated them and contributed to the animosity directed toward us.

For whatever reasons the Neo-conservatives might give, they are bound and determined to confront the Iranian government and demand changes in its leadership. This policy will further spread our military presence and undermine our security. The sad truth is that the supposed dangers posed by Iran are no more real than those claimed about Iraq. The charges made against Iran are unsubstantiated, and amazingly sound very similar to the false charges made against Iraq. One would think promoters of the war against Iraq would be a little bit more reluctant to use the same arguments to stir up hatred toward Iran. The American people and Congress should be more cautious in accepting these charges at face value. Yet it seems the propaganda is working, since few in Washington object as Congress passes resolutions condemning Iran and asking for UN sanctions against her.

There is no evidence of a threat to us by Iran, and no reason to plan and initiate a confrontation with her. There are many reasons not to do so, however.

Iran does not have a nuclear weapon and there’s no evidence that she is working on one--only conjecture.

If Iran had a nuclear weapon, why would this be different from Pakistan, India, and North Korea having one? Why does Iran have less right to a defensive weapon than these other countries?

If Iran had a nuclear weapon, the odds of her initiating an attack against anybody-- which would guarantee her own annihilation-- are zero. And the same goes for the possibility she would place weapons in the hands of a non-state terrorist group.

Pakistan has spread nuclear technology throughout the world, and in particular to the North Koreans. They flaunt international restrictions on nuclear weapons. But we reward them just as we reward India.

We needlessly and foolishly threaten Iran even though they have no nuclear weapons. But listen to what a leading Israeli historian, Martin Van Creveld, had to say about this: “Obviously, we don’t want Iran to have a nuclear weapon, and I don’t know if they’re developing them, but if they’re not developing them, they’re crazy.”

There’s been a lot of misinformation regarding Iran’s nuclear program. This distortion of the truth has been used to pump up emotions in Congress to pass resolutions condemning her and promoting UN sanctions.

IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradi has never reported any evidence of “undeclared” sources or special nuclear material in Iran, or any diversion of nuclear material.

We demand that Iran prove it is not in violation of nuclear agreements, which is asking them impossibly to prove a negative. El Baradi states Iran is in compliance with the nuclear NPT required IAEA safeguard agreement.

We forget that the weapons we feared Saddam Hussein had were supplied to him by the U.S., and we refused to believe UN inspectors and the CIA that he no longer had them.

Likewise, Iran received her first nuclear reactor from us. Now we’re hysterically wondering if someday she might decide to build a bomb in self interest.

Anti-Iran voices, beating the drums of confrontation, distort the agreement made in Paris and the desire of Iran to restart the enrichment process. Their suspension of the enrichment process was voluntary, and not a legal obligation. Iran has an absolute right under the NPT to develop and use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, and this is now said to be an egregious violation of the NPT. It’s the U.S. and her allies that are distorting and violating the NPT. Likewise our provision of nuclear materials to India is a clear violation of the NPT.

The demand for UN sanctions is now being strongly encouraged by Congress. The “Iran Freedom Support Act,” HR 282, passed in the International Relations Committee; and recently the House passed H Con Res 341, which inaccurately condemned Iran for violating its international nuclear non-proliferation obligations. At present, the likelihood of reason prevailing in Congress is minimal. Let there be no doubt: The Neo-conservative warriors are still in charge, and are conditioning Congress, the media, and the American people for a pre-emptive attack on Iran. Never mind that Afghanistan has unraveled and Iraq is in civil war: serious plans are being laid for the next distraction which will further spread this war in the Middle East. The unintended consequences of this effort surely will be worse than any of the complications experienced in the three-year occupation of Iraq.

Our offer of political and financial assistance to foreign and domestic individuals who support the overthrow of the current Iranian government is fraught with danger and saturated with arrogance. Imagine how American citizens would respond if China supported similar efforts here in the United States to bring about regime change! How many of us would remain complacent if someone like Timothy McVeigh had been financed by a foreign power? Is it any wonder the Iranian people resent us and the attitude of our leaders? Even though El Baradi and his IAEA investigations have found no violations of the NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement, the Iran Freedom Support Act still demands that Iran prove they have no nuclear weapons-- refusing to acknowledge that proving a negative is impossible.

Let there be no doubt, though the words “regime change” are not found in the bill-- that’s precisely what they are talking about. Neo-conservative Michael Ledeen, one of the architects of the Iraq fiasco, testifying before the International Relations Committee in favor of the IFSA, stated it plainly: “I know some Members would prefer to dance around the explicit declaration of regime change as the policy of this country, but anyone looking closely at the language and context of the IFSA and its close relative in the Senate, can clearly see that this is in fact the essence of the matter. You can’t have freedom in Iran without bringing down the Mullahs.”

Sanctions, along with financial and political support to persons and groups dedicated to the overthrow of the Iranian government, are acts of war. Once again we’re unilaterally declaring a pre-emptive war against a country and a people that have not harmed us and do not have the capacity to do so. And don’t expect Congress to seriously debate a declaration of war resolution. For the past 56 years Congress has transferred to the executive branch the power to go to war as it pleases, regardless of the tragic results and costs.

Secretary of State Rice recently signaled a sharp shift towards confrontation in Iran policy as she insisted on $75 million to finance propaganda, through TV and radio broadcasts into Iran. She expressed this need because of the so-called “aggressive” policies of the Iranian government. We’re seven thousand miles from home, telling the Iraqis and the Iranians what kind of government they will have, backed up by the use of our military force, and we call them the aggressors. We fail to realize the Iranian people, for whatever faults they may have, have not in modern times aggressed against any neighbor. This provocation is so unnecessary, costly, and dangerous.

Just as the invasion of Iraq inadvertently served the interests of the Iranians, military confrontation with Iran will have unintended consequences. The successful alliance engendered between the Iranians and the Iraqi majority Shia will prove a formidable opponent for us in Iraq as that civil war spreads. Shipping in the Persian Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz may well be disrupted by the Iranians in retaliation for any military confrontation. Since Iran would be incapable of defending herself by conventional means, it seems logical that some might resort to a terrorist attack on us. They will not passively lie down, nor can they be destroyed easily.

One of the reasons given for going into Iraq was to secure “our” oil supply. This backfired badly: Production in Iraq is down 50%, and world oil prices have more than doubled to $60 per barrel. Meddling with Iran could easily have a similar result. We could see oil over $120 a barrel and, and $6 gas at the pump. The obsession the Neo-cons have with remaking the Middle East is hard to understand. One thing that is easy to understand is none of those who planned these wars expect to fight in them, nor do they expect their children to die in some IED explosion.

Exactly when an attack will occur is not known, but we have been forewarned more than once that all options remain on the table. The sequence of events now occurring with regards to Iran are eerily reminiscent of the hype prior to our pre-emptive strike against Iraq. We should remember the saying: “Fool me once shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me.” It looks to me like the Congress and the country is open to being fooled once again.

Interestingly, many early supporters of the Iraq war are now highly critical of the President, having been misled as to reasons for the invasion and occupation. But these same people are only too eager to accept the same flawed arguments for our need to undermine the Iranian government.

The President’s 2006 National Security Strategy, just released, is every bit as frightening as the one released in 2002 endorsing pre-emptive war. In it he claims: “We face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.” He claims the Iranians have for 20 years hidden key nuclear activities-- though the IAEA makes no such assumptions nor has the Security Council in these 20 years ever sanctioned Iran. The clincher in the National Security Strategy document is if diplomatic efforts fail, confrontation will follow. The problem is the diplomatic effort-- if one wants to use that term-- is designed to fail by demanding the Iranians prove an unproveable negative. The West-- led by the U.S.-- is in greater violation by demanding Iran not pursue any nuclear technology, even peaceful, that the NPT guarantees is their right.

The President states: Iran’s “desire to have a nuclear weapon is unacceptable.” A “desire” is purely subjective, and cannot be substantiated nor disproved. Therefore all that is necessary to justify an attack is if Iran fails to prove it doesn’t have a “desire” to be like the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France, Pakistan, India, and Israel—whose nuclear missiles surround Iran. Logic like this to justify a new war, without the least consideration for a congressional declaration of war, is indeed frightening.

Common sense tells us Congress, especially given the civil war in Iraq and the mess in Afghanistan, should move with great caution in condoning a military confrontation with Iran.


Cause for Concern

Most Americans are uninterested in foreign affairs until we get mired down in a war that costs too much, last too long, and kills too many U.S. troops. Getting out of a lengthy war is difficult, as I remember all too well with Vietnam while serving in the U.S. Air Force from 1963 to 1968. Getting into war is much easier. Unfortunately the Legislative branch of our government too often defers to the Executive branch, and offers little resistance to war plans even with no significant threat to our security. The need to go to war is always couched in patriotic terms and falsehoods regarding an imaginary eminent danger. Not supporting the effort is painted as unpatriotic and wimpish against some evil that’s about to engulf us. The real reason for our militarism is rarely revealed and hidden from the public. Even Congress is deceived into supporting adventurism they would not accept if fully informed.

If we accepted the traditional American and constitutional foreign policy of non-intervention across the board, there would be no temptation to go along with these unnecessary military operations. A foreign policy of intervention invites all kinds of excuses for spreading ourselves around the world. The debate shifts from non-intervention versus interventionism, to where and for what particular reason should we involve ourselves. Most of the time it’s for less than honorable reasons. Even when cloaked in honorable slogans-- like making the world safe for democracy-- the unintended consequences and the ultimate costs cancel out the good intentions.

One of the greatest losses suffered these past 60 years from interventionism becoming an acceptable policy of both major parties is respect for the Constitution. Congress flatly has reneged on its huge responsibility to declare war. Going to war was never meant to be an Executive decision, used indiscriminately with no resistance from Congress. The strongest attempt by Congress in the past 60 years to properly exert itself over foreign policy was the passage of the Foley Amendment, demanding no assistance be given to the Nicaraguan contras. Even this explicit prohibition was flaunted by an earlier administration.

Arguing over the relative merits of each intervention is not a true debate, because it assumes that intervention per se is both moral and constitutional. Arguing for a Granada-type intervention because of its “success,” and against the Iraq war because of its failure and cost, is not enough. We must once again understand the wisdom of rejecting entangling alliances and rejecting nation building. We must stop trying to police the world and instead embrace non-interventionism as the proper, moral, and constitutional foreign policy.

The best reason to oppose interventionism is that people die, needlessly, on both sides. We have suffered over 20,000 American casualties in Iraq already, and Iraq civilian deaths probably number over 100,000 by all reasonable accounts. The next best reason is that the rule of law is undermined, especially when military interventions are carried out without a declaration of war. Whenever a war is ongoing, civil liberties are under attack at home. The current war in Iraq and the misnamed war on terror have created an environment here at home that affords little constitutional protection of our citizen’s rights. Extreme nationalism is common during wars. Signs of this are now apparent.

Prolonged wars, as this one has become, have profound consequences. No matter how much positive spin is put on it, war never makes a society wealthier. World War II was not a solution to the Depression as many claim. If a billion dollars is spent on weapons of war, the GDP records positive growth in that amount. But the expenditure is consumed by destruction of the weapons or bombs it bought, and the real economy is denied $1 billion to produce products that would have raised someone’s standard of living.

Excessive spending to finance the war causes deficits to explode. There are never enough tax dollars available to pay the bills, and since there are not enough willing lenders and dollars available, the Federal Reserve must create enough new money and credit for buying Treasury Bills to prevent interest rates from rising too rapidly. Rising rates would tip off everyone that there are not enough savings or taxes to finance the war. This willingness to print whatever amount of money the government needs to pursue the war is literally inflation. Without a fiat monetary system wars would be very difficult to finance, since the people would never tolerate the taxes required to pay for it. Inflation of the money supply delays and hides the real cost of war. The result of the excessive creation of new money leads to the higher cost of living everyone decries and the Fed denies. Since taxes are not levied, the increase in prices that results from printing too much money is technically the tax required to pay for the war.

The tragedy is that the inflation tax is borne more by the poor and the middle class than the rich. Meanwhile, the well-connected rich, the politicians, the bureaucrats, the bankers, the military industrialists, and the international corporations reap the benefits of war profits.

A sound economic process is disrupted with a war economy and monetary inflation. Strong voices emerge blaming the wrong policies for our problems, prompting an outcry for protectionist legislation. It’s always easier to blame foreign producers and savers for our inflation, lack of savings, excess debt, and loss of industrial jobs. Protectionist measures only make economic conditions worse. Inevitably these conditions, if not corrected, lead to a lower standard of living for most of our citizens.

Careless military intervention is also bad for the civil disturbance that results. The chaos in the streets of America in the 1960s while the Vietnam War raged, aggravated by the draft, was an example of domestic strife caused by an ill-advised unconstitutional war that could not be won. The early signs of civil discord are now present. Hopefully we can extricate ourselves from Iraq and avoid a conflict in Iran before our streets explode as they did in the 60s.

In a way it’s amazing there’s not a lot more outrage expressed by the American people. There’s plenty of complaining but no outrage over policies that are not part of our American tradition. War based on false pretenses, 20,000 American casualties, torture policies, thousands jailed without due process, illegal surveillance of citizens, warrantless searches, and yet no outrage. When the issues come before Congress, Executive authority is maintained or even strengthened while real oversight is ignored.

Though many Americans are starting to feel the economic pain of paying for this war through inflation, the real pain has not yet arrived. We generally remain fat and happy, with a system of money and borrowing that postpones the day of reckoning. Foreigners, in particular the Chinese and Japanese, gladly participate in the charade. We print the money and they take it, as do the OPEC nations, and provide us with consumer goods and oil. Then they loan the money back to us at low interest rates, which we use to finance the war and our housing bubble and excessive consumption. This recycling and perpetual borrowing of inflated dollars allows us to avoid the pain of high taxes to pay for our war and welfare spending. It’s fine until the music stops and the real costs are realized, with much higher interest rates and significant price inflation. That’s when outrage will be heard, and the people will realize we can’t afford the “humanitarianism” of the Neo-conservatives.

The notion that our economic problems are principally due to the Chinese is nonsense. If the protectionists were to have their way, the problem of financing the war would become readily apparent and have immediate ramifications-- none good. Today’s economic problems, caused largely by our funny money system, won’t be solved by altering exchange rates to favor us in the short run, or by imposing high tariffs. Only sound money with real value will solve the problems of competing currency devaluations and protectionist measures.

Economic interests almost always are major reasons for wars being fought. Noble and patriotic causes are easier to sell to a public who must pay and provide cannon fodder to defend the financial interests of a privileged class.

The fact that Saddam Hussein demanded Euros for oil in an attempt to undermine the U.S. dollar is believed by many to be one of the ulterior motives for our invasion and occupation of Iraq. Similarly, the Iranian oil burse now about to open may be seen as a threat to those who depend on maintaining the current monetary system with the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.

The theory and significance of “peak oil” is believed to be an additional motivating factor for the U.S. and Great Britain wanting to maintain firm control over the oil supplies in the Middle East. The two nations have been protecting “our” oil interests in the Middle East for nearly a hundred years. With diminishing supplies and expanding demands, the incentive to maintain a military presence in the Middle East is quite strong. Fear of China and Russia moving into this region to assume more control alarms those who don’t understand how a free market can develop substitutes to replace diminishing resources. Supporters of the military effort to maintain control over large regions of the world to protect oil fail to count the real costs once the DOD budget is factored in. Remember, invading Iraq was costly and oil prices doubled. Confrontation in Iran may evolve differently, but we can be sure it will be costly and oil prices will rise.

There are long-term consequences or blowback from our militant policy of intervention around the world. They are unpredictable as to time and place. 9/11 was a consequence of our military presence on Muslim holy lands; the Ayatollah Khomeini’s success in taking over the Iranian government in 1979 was a consequence of our CIA overthrowing Mossadech in 1953. These connections are rarely recognized by the American people and never acknowledged by our government. We never seem to learn how dangerous interventionism is to us and to our security.

There are some who may not agree strongly with any of my arguments, and instead believe the propaganda: Iran and her President, Mahmoud Almadinjad, are thoroughly irresponsible and have threatened to destroy Israel. So all measures must be taken to prevent Iran from getting nukes-- thus the campaign to intimidate and confront Iran.

First, Iran doesn’t have a nuke and is nowhere close to getting one, according to the CIA. If they did have one, using it would guarantee almost instantaneous annihilation by Israel and the United States. Hysterical fear of Iran is way out of proportion to reality. With a policy of containment, we stood down and won the Cold War against the Soviets and their 30,000 nuclear weapons and missiles. If you’re looking for a real kook with a bomb to worry about, North Korea would be high on the list. Yet we negotiate with Kim Jong Il. Pakistan has nukes and was a close ally of the Taliban up until 9/11. Pakistan was never inspected by the IAEA as to their military capability. Yet we not only talk to her, we provide economic assistance-- though someday Musharraf may well be overthrown and a pro-al Qaeda government put in place. We have been nearly obsessed with talking about regime change in Iran, while ignoring Pakistan and North Korea. It makes no sense and it’s a very costly and dangerous policy.

The conclusion we should derive from this is simple: It’s in our best interest to pursue a foreign policy of non-intervention. A strict interpretation of the Constitution mandates it. The moral imperative of not imposing our will on others, no matter how well intentioned, is a powerful argument for minding our own business. The principle of self-determination should be respected. Strict non-intervention removes the incentives for foreign powers and corporate interests to influence our policies overseas. We can’t afford the cost that intervention requires, whether through higher taxes or inflation. If the moral arguments against intervention don’t suffice for some, the practical arguments should.

Intervention just doesn’t work. It backfires and ultimately hurts American citizens both at home and abroad. Spreading ourselves too thin around the world actually diminishes our national security through a weakened military. As the superpower of the world, a constant interventionist policy is perceived as arrogant, and greatly undermines our ability to use diplomacy in a positive manner.

Conservatives, libertarians, constitutionalists, and many of today’s liberals have all at one time or another endorsed a less interventionist foreign policy. There’s no reason a coalition of these groups might not once again present the case for a pro-American, non-militant, non-interventionist foreign policy dealing with all nations. A policy of trade and peace, and a willingness to use diplomacy, is far superior to the foreign policy that has evolved over the past 60 years.

It’s time for a change.